Mitakshara divides the property into two classes, namely, apratibandha daya or unobstructed heritage, and sapritibanda daya or obstructed heritage. Property in which a person acquires an interest by birth is called unobstructed heritage because the accrual of the right to it is not obstructed by the existence of the owner. The right to it arises from the mere fact of their birth in the family, and they become coparceners with their paternal ancestor in such property immediately on their birth, ancestral property is unobstructed heritage.

All properties inherited by a Hindu male from a direct male ancestor, not exceeding three degrees higher to him is called apratibandha daya.[1]

The property, rights to which accrues not by birth but on the death of the last owner without leaving male issue, is called obstructed heritage. It is called obstructed because the accrual of the right to it is obstructed by the existence of the owner. Thus, the property which devolves on parents, brothers, nephews, uncles, etc., upon the death of the last owner, is obstructed heritage. These relations do not take a vested interest in the property by birth. Their right to it arises for the first time on the death of the owner.

Coparceners can restrain the holder of sapratibandha daya from alienating it, while in case of apratibandha daya its holder, so long as he is living, has absolute rights of alienation over it: he may gift it inter vivos or by will, he may sell it or mortgage.[2] Unobstructed heritage devolves by survivorship, obstructed heritage, by succession.

When the sons inherit separate property of their father vis-à-vis each other, they take it as separate property, but the moment a son is born to any one of them, vis-à-vis their sons it becomes the joint family property.[3] In Municipal Council, Mandasaur V. Fakir Chand,[4] since the brothers became the owners of their father’s property only after his death vis-à-vis themselves, it was held to be not joint family property as they did not have birth right in it.

The distinction between obstructed and unobstructed heritage is peculiar only to Mitakshara School. According to Dayabhaga, all heritages are obstructed, for, according to the doctrines of that school, no person, not even a son, takes an interest by birth in the property of another. Dayabhaga does not recognise the principle of survivorship.

Joint family property and separate property, -Secondly, and rather significantly, property is classified into:

  1. Joint family property or coparcenary property, and
  2. Separate property or self-acquired property.


Broadly speaking, property inherited from an ancestor or ancestress may be called ancestral property, but it is not this sense in which it is used in Hindu law. It has a technical meaning. Inherited property may be classified under the following heads:

  1. Property inherited from father, father’s father or father’s father’s father,
  2. Property inherited from the maternal grandfather, and
  3. Property inherited from any other relation.


This is the same as sapratibandha daya and it is the property which is called ancestral property.[5]

This controversy has also been resolved by the amendment act of 2005 by virtue of sub-section 3. According to the provision, now the share of a deceased Hindu having a share in joint Hindu family shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship.

It has been further clarified that after passing of the Hindu succession act,1956 any property inherited by a male person from his paternal ancestor would be his self-acquired property[6].


According to Mitakshara, this head is not necessary, as under Mitakshara property inherited from any person, other than the father, father’s father and father’s father’s father, is obstructed heritage and there is no distinction whether the property is inherited from a paternal uncle or a maternal uncle.

But two Privy Council decisions have necessitated this classification. In Venkayyamma V. Venkatarayyammamana,[7] two brothers inherited from the maternal grandfather, one of them died without a male issue, his wife claimed on the rule of succession, and the brother on the rule of survivorship.

Madras provincial court gave the ruling in favor of the brother to inherit the property as the last sole surviving heir. In Md. Husain v. Kisheva,[8] Privy Council went against the earlier judgment and held that when a Hindu inherits property from his maternal grandmother or father, his son does not acquire any interest by birth in the family.

Even in the earlier case, the did not say that it is an unobstructed restrictively interpreted to mean that brothers inheriting property from their maternal grandfather take it inter se as joint family property. In Maktul V. Manbhari,[9] a case under the Punjab Customary law, the supreme court held that the property inherited by a person from his maternal grandfather is not ancestral qua his descendants.


It is settled that property inherited by a person from any other relation than the above-mentioned relations is not ancestral property. Such property is his separate property and his son does not take it any interest in it by birth. For example, property inherited from a maternal or paternal uncle will constitute separate property.[10] Similarly, property coming from issueless brothers and property acquired from a sister who had relinquished her share would not be ancestral property.[11]


When a co-parcener partition from the joint family and obtains his share of the property, the character of this property in respect of his own son, son’s son and son’ son’s son, will continue to be joint family property, but in respect of all others, it will be his separate property.[12] In-State of Maharashtra V. Narayan Rao,[13] the supreme court held that on the death of the Karta, though his widow would take a share by virtue of section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, that does not mean that family stands divided till the widow takes away her share of members affecting a partition, the family will remain a join family.

Property acquired by a coparcener after severance of status will be his separate property.[14] On the other hand, properties having a joint family nucleus till partition will be joint family property.[15]


Whenever a coparcener expresses his intention to partition, severance of status takes place. But then does it also mean that the Hindu joint family property loses his character of joint family property. There has been some confusion in this regard. The same has now been clarified by the supreme court in Bhagwati P. Sulakhe V. Digamber Gopal Sulakhe,[16] A.N. Sen, J. observed:

“the character of any joint family property does not change with severance of the status of the joint family and a joint family property continues to retain its joint family character so long as the joint family property is in existence and is not partitioned among the co-sharers. By a unilateral act, it is not open to any member of the joint family property to convert any joint family property into his personal property.”

In this case under the partnership agreement and the managing agency agreement, two members of the joint family were receiving certain remunerations and commissions as managing agents on behalf of the joint family. A member of the joint family effected severance of status.

The question before the Court was whether the amount received thereafter as remuneration and managing agency commission became separate property or continued to remain part of the joint family property. It was in this context that the above observation was made.


Under this head, the gift of the following properties may be considered:

  1. Gift of self-acquired property by the father to son; and
  2. Gift of joint family property:
  3. By father-Karta, or
  4. By Karta


The question is, if a father gives his self-acquired property, movable or immovable by gift inter vivos or by will to one of his sons, to the exclusion of others, whether, the son will take it as ancestral property. The difficulty arises on account of two principals of Hindu law that come into application:

  • Every Hindu has full power of disposal over his separate property;
  • When self-acquired property of a Hindu devolves on his son by inheritance, the son takes it as ancestral property in which his son has an interest by birth.

In accordance with the first principle, the father has power of giving the property in gift. But, can he, by changing the mode of devolution of property, change the character of property? In other words, had he allowed it devolve by the natural mode, i.e., intestate succession, the property would have been ancestral property in the hands of his son, but he changes the mode of devolution and makes it to devolve by gift, can he thereby change the character of the property?

It may be noted that if A who has three sons, B, C and D, makes a gift of his self-acquired property to C to the exclusion of B and D, the question is not whether B or D could challenge.

They obviously cannot. The question is: can C’s sons claim an interest in it by birth? Before 1953 there was difference of opinion among our High Courts and as many as five views existed. But in 1953, the Supreme court in Arunachalam V. Murugantha,[17] after considering the texts and the various decisions of the High Courts, said the answer to the question primarily depends upon the intention of the father.

The intention is to be gathered from the terms of the deed. In other words, if the father expressed clear intention un the deed that the son will take it as his separate property, or joint family property, the son will take it accordingly. In case the father has not expressed his intention clearly, then the intention is to be gathered from the language of the deed and from the surrounding circumstances.

This is not a satisfactory test. It seems that if it is shown that the so-called gift was not a gift but an integral part of the scheme of partition, then the donee son will take the property as joint family property.[18] It is submitted that the entire argument is misconceived. It may be argued that had the father allowed it to devolve by inheritance, other son’s too would have got an interest in it and constituted a coparcenary.

But the father did not allow it to devolve that way and made a gift of it. Then why should we talk of donee’s son’s claim, and why should we also not talk of the claim of the other sons of the Donor? It is submitted that the simple rule should be that the donee-son takes it as his separate property, subject to any restrictions that the father might have imposed on the gift.


It has been all along recognized that the father-Karta has the power of making a gift of small portion of movable joint family property as a gift of love and affection. A gift of love ad affection is made to a person with whom the father stands in the relationship of love and affection, such a wife, son, daughter, daughter-in-law. In every case gift has to be a small portion of the joint family movable property.

What is a small portion will depend upon the total quantum of joint family property.[19] Before 1964, the view was that the father cannot give any portion of immovable property in gift. But in1964 the Supreme court in Guramma V. Mallappa,[20] said that the father can make a gift of love and affection to a daughter of a small portion of immovable property, either at the time of marriage or subsequently, as a gift to daughter is a modern version of a share in the joint family to which she was entitled in the ancient law.[21]

It has also been held in R. Kuppayee V. Raja Gounder,[22] that father can gift ancestral immovable property to his daughter within reasonable limits. This view is not correct as there is hardly any textual authority for this view. In later cases the supreme court has confined the ratio of their decision to the gift to daughter. Thus, it was held that gift of immovable property could not be made to any relation even to one’s wife.[23] In the hands of a donee such property is his separate property, unless given with limitations.


It is an established rule of the Hindu law that the Karta of the joint family, whether father or someone else has the gift of ancestral movable as well as immovable property within the reasonable limits in discharge of his religious duties or for pious purposes. Such a gift can be inter vivos and not by will.[24] In the hands of a donee the property will be his separate property.


Here the question is: whether the property jointly acquired by coparceners with their joint labor and without the aid of the joint family property is joint family property or joint property of the acquirers. It is now settled law that presumption isthat the property so acquired will be joint family property in which sons will acquire interest by birth, unless it is provided that the acquirers intended to own the property as co-owners between themselves in which case it will be joint property, as distinguished from joint family property.[25]

In case the acquirers can show an agreement that they acquired the property as partners, the property will be partnership property, governed by the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. However, if only some of the coparceners jointly acquire property without the aid of any ancestral nucleus, the presumption will not apply and such property will be presumed to be joint family property, unless contrary is proved.[26]

Property acquired jointly by a member of a family by putting together their earnings is in common not joint family property. Members are co-sharers and not coparceners.[27]

INCOME OF HEREDITORY PROFESSION:the income of the hereditary profession, such as of a priest, constitutes joint family property.[28]

PROPERTY EXCHANGED FOR JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY:when some property is acquired in exchange of joint family property, such property will not be joint family property.[29]


When a coparcener mixes his separate property with the joint family property, and deals with his separate property in a manner that he leaves no doubts that he wants to treat it as part of the joint family property, such property becomes a joint family property.This is known as ‘throwing in to the common stock.’If he mixes his property with the joint family property it is known as blending.

In Mallesappa v. Mallappa,[30]Gajendragadkar.J , said that ‘the conduct on which the plea of blending is based must clearly and unequivocally show the intention of the owner of the separate property to convert his property into an item of joint family property, a mere intention to benefit the members of the family by allowing them the use of the income from the separate property may not necessarily be enough to justify an inference of blending’.

In Narayanan v. Radhakrishna,[31]Shah J – said, ‘ the separate property or self-acquired property of a coparcener may be impressed with the character of joint family property, if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein,but to establish such abandonment, a clear intention by waiver of separate rights must be established.

However, a female member of the joint family has no power of throwing her separate property into the common stock; only coparceners possess this right.[32]

If a coparcener builds a house on joint family land out of his separate funds, the other coparceners will be entitled to compensation for their share of land,[33] or a share in the site on partition,[34]unless it is clearly shown that the coparcener wanted to blend his separate property with the joint family property. The onus that house was constructed out of self-acquired property is on the coparcener, and if blending is shown, it will be part of joint family property.[35]


When one coparcener, without any assistance from the joint family funds or from his fellow coparceners recovers with the acquiescence of his coparceners, ancestral property which has been lost to the joint family without any possibility of recovery, the property so recovered will be:

  • The separate property of the recoverer if the recoverer is the Karta of the family, irrespective of the fact whether the recovered property is immovable or movable,
  • If the recoverer is any other coparcener, and the property is movable, the property will be the separate property of the recoverer, and

In case the recoverer is a coparcener other than the Karta and property recovered is immovable property, the recoverer will take one-fourth of it as his separate property and the rest will become joint family property in which all members, including the recovering coparcener, will have an interest.


Accretions are all incomes, accumulations, or acquisitions of property made with the joint family nucleus. It includes:

 a) Accumulations of income of the joint family property;

b) Property purchased or acquired with the intention of the joint family, and

c) Proceeds of the sale of joint family property or property purchased out of such sale-proceeds;

These have been, all along, accepted as part and parcel of joint family property.

It has been seen earlier that the proof of existence of Hindu joint family does not lead to the presumption that the property held by any member of the family is joint and the burden lies upon the person who asserts that the property or any item of it is a joint family property.[36] But where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property.[37]

Thus, in Mangal V. Harkesh,[38] where it was established that there was some nucleus of the joint family property, but it was not established that yield from the nucleus was sufficient for acquiring the property in question, it was held that the initial burden has not been discharged and the properties cannot be held to be joint family properties. In Rajmal V. Rajmal,[39] the Karta acquired certain properties to pe-emption and it was not proved that the pre-emption price was paid out of the family funds, it was held that the property acquired could not be held to be joint family property.[40]

In Anup Singh V. Harbans Kaur,[41] it was established that the income of the joint family property was very small and inadequate and that the coparcener during his lifetime made substantial earnings on account of his salary and other emoluments in the service of the Maharaja, from whom he had purchased the property in question, and had gifted it absolutely to his wife during his lifetime, it was held that these properties were his separate properties. Where there is no joint family nucleus, the property acquired is separate property.[42]

An undivided coparcener can carry on separate business.[43]

In Mallappa v. Yallappagounda,[44] it was established that there was sufficient nucleus of joint family fund out of which the property in question could have been acquired by the Karta, and there was no other personal source from which the Karta could have acquired them, it was held that such property constituted joint family property, and burden will shift on the person who alleges that the properties are self-acquired.[45]

Where the joint family nucleus is normal or non-existent, the burden that the properties acquired by a coparcener were acquired from the joint family nucleus is not discharged by showing that the Karta was carrying on the traditional business of the family or in that business he was assisted by his son.[46]The proportion of the nucleus itself in relation to the estate is only one factor and where this is considerable, the presumption arises that the acquisition of property made with its aid is joint family property.

But the income yielding capacity of the nucleus is an equally important factor.[47] Similarly, any property acquired by the Karta out of his own income in the name of his son will not constitute the joint family property.[48] When the joint family property is in the separate and convenient enjoyment of members, any property acquired by a coparcener out of the income of such property will be joint family property.[49]

PROERTY PURCHASED IN THE NAME OF FEMALE MEMBER: – If property is purchased in the name of a female member no presumption arises that it is joint family property.[50]


A member of the Hindu Joint family or a coparcener can, under Hindu law, make separate acquisition of property. When the concept of the self-acquired or the separate property of the coparcener can into existence, it seems that in the beginning the acquirer was given a double share,[51] or was permitted to retain the property during his lifetime. Gradually, this was converted inti the separate property of the coparcener.[52]

The following text of Yajanvalkya succinctly sums up the doctrine of self-acquisition:

“Whatever is acquired by the coparcener himself, without detriment to the father’s estate, as a present from a friend, or a gift at nuptials, does not appertain to the co-heirs. Nor shall he who recovers hereditary property which has been taken away give it up to coparceners; nor what has been gained by science.”

The Mitakshara (1, 4, 6) comments on the text are:

“Consequently what is obtained from a friend as the return of an obligation conferred at the charge of the patrimony : what is received at marriage concluded in Asura from or the like; what is recovered of the hereditary estate by the expenditure of the ancestral wealth; all must be shared with the whole of the brethren and the father.”

Vijnaneshwara then observed:

“He needs not give up to the co-heirs what has been gained by him through science, by reading the scriptures or by expounding their meaning.”

The key words in the doctrine of self-acquisition are “what has been acquired without any detriment to the joint family property.” Thus, the separate property may be obtained from several sources.

Gains of learning- According to Katyayana’s enumeration, gains of learning fall under the following categories:

  • Anything gained by providing superior learning after a price has been offered;
  • Anything obtained from a pupil or by officiating as a priest, or for answering any question or for determining a point in dispute, or for reciting the Vedas, or by display of knowledge or by success in debate;
  • Anything gained by providing superior skill by winning from another a stake at a play;
  • Anything obtained by boast of learning, anything received from a pupil or by the performance of a sacrifice;
  • Anything obtained by an artist by performance or display of art or anything which is gained in access or prescribed higher; and
  • Anything gained from superiority in learning and what has been acquired in a sacrifice or from a pupil or acquired by art and science.

In the year 1930, the Hindu Gains of Learning Act was passed and laid down that whether the training is ordinary or specialised, any gains made on account of training or education will constitute separate property of the acquirer. The act defines, “learning” as education whether elementary, technical, scientific, special or general and, “training” as every kind of training which is usually intended to enable a person to pursue any trade, industry, profession or avocation in life.

“Gains of learning” are defined as acquisitions of property made substantially by means of learning, whether such acquisitions be made before or after the commencement of the Act and whether such acquisitions be the ordinary or the extra ordinary result of such learning. It is immaterial whether the education or training was wholly or partly imparted to him out of joint family funds or with the aid of the funds of any member of the joint family funds. It is also immaterial that while he was receiving training or education, he or his family was maintained or supported, partly or wholly, out of joint family funds or by the funds of any member of the joint family.[53]

However, if the joint family funds are invested in the business, industry or profession which the coparcener takes up after receiving education or training, the acquisitions may not be his separate property. For instance, if a coparcener is trained as an engineer, and the joint family, in view of restraining, opens up an industry in which joint family funds are invested, the profits of this industry will not be separate property of the engineer-coparcener, though if he is allowed to draw a salary or allowed to take a part of profit for his skill, that will constitute his separate property.


The question with which we are concerned is: if joint family properties are invested in an enterprise, industry or undertaking and by the reason of such investment, the Karta or any other coparcener whether on behalf of the family or otherwise, is employed by the concern, industry or undertaking, will any salary, remuneration, fee or commission that he may receive in that capacity, be the separate property of the coparcener or Karta or will it be part of joint family funds? It may be added that in earning such remuneration, fee or commission, an element of skill or labour may be involved.

In P.R.A. Lal V. Income Tax Commr.,[54] where the manager of a business concern and the joint family had given security of its properties for the honesty of the Karta, the supreme court said that the earnings of the Karta as the manager were not the result of the families investment, but were the outcome of Karta’s personal skill or labour. The joint family was earning interest on the fund given as security for Karta’s honesty. The supreme court has overruled this view in Palaneappa V. Commr. Of Income Tax.[55]

The court said that as no part of the family funds had been spend to enable the Karta to earn the remuneration of managing director, but the family funds had been invested to obtain dividends and other advantages of being shareholders, the salary, commission and siting fees of the Karta as managing Director belong to him personally.[56]

In Commr. Of income tax V. DC Shah,[57] where the partnership deed showed that one of the co-parceners as partner was to given a salary on account of his rich experience and skill, the court held that the salary constituted his self-acquired property, despite the fact that the family contributed a large part of the capital to the firm, as the connection between the salary and the detriment was not sufficient.[58]

S.K. Kapoor, J. summed up the position thus : if acquisitions are made by a coparcener by the us of family funds, these will constitute joint family property. If, on the other hand, acquisitions are made without the aid of the joint family funds, they will constitute his separate property.[59]

In our submission the present position in law is : if remuneration, salary, profit or commission is earned by the Karta or any other coparcener on account of substantial investments of the joint family funds in the undertaking, business, enterprise, industry, it will constitute joint family property, even if the personal skill or labour of the Karta or the coparcener, receiving profits, dividends, interest or some other returns on investments without any detriment to the joint family funds of properties, the earnings will constitute the separate properties of the earner. The fact that the Karta stands in fiduciary relationship with the other members of the family is immaterial.


When Karta gives a right to coparcener the right to use some joint family property for his maintenance, and there is some surplus income remaining after the maintenance or any property is purchased out of the surplus, will it be joint family property or separate property of the coparcener? The Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts take the view that such surplus or property purchased out of surplus will be separate property of the coparcener.[60]

The former said that the acquisitions were as much the result of his own industry and thrift as they were the natural products of the land itself. The court reiterated this view in Chinna V. Venkatta,[61] and said even if the coparcener invests separate property as to hold otherwise will go to kill: “the spirit of initiative and enterprise.”

The Madras High court reiterated its earlier view in Nagayasami V. Kochadai.[62] But where members of a family decide for purposes of convenience to take charge of certain properties of the family in their individual charge and administer them, it does not automatically follow that the individual members who have been charged with the responsibility of possessing them are not to account for their income.[63]


If the Karta ensures himself, or a member of the family is insured, and premia are paid out of the joint family funds, then, who would be entitled to the benefits of the policy? The Madras High Court took the view that benefits belong to the insured personally and constitute his separate property.[64]

The supreme court, in Prabhavati V. Sarandhar,[65] made the following observation: “there is no proposition of the law by which the insurance policies must be regarded as the separate property of the coparceners on whose lives the insurance is effected by the coparcener.” The supreme court further observed that if the insurance policy were taken with any detriment to the joint family funds, then anything obtained thereby would belong to the joint family.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Narayanlal V. Collector of Estate Duty,[66] said that in every case, where joint family funds are used for payment of premia of a life insurance policy, there is a detriment to the joint family, but that is not the sole criterion. If the joint family funds are advanced to members of the coparcenary for their individual benefit, there is strictly speaking, a detriment to the joint family, nonetheless the intention with which that money was given and the use of it by the individual for his own benefit would determine the character of the income or the amount earned therefrom. It is submitted that this seems to be the correct view.


If property, movable or immovable, is grantedto a coparcener by the Government, it will constitute the separate property of the grantee[67] unless it has been specifically given to him as joint family property.[68]


Income from the separate property or property acquired with such income will be separate property of the coparcener.[69] A coparcener can also carry on separate business.[70]


Separate earnings of coparcener or earnings by self-exertion, without the aid of the joint family property, constitute separate property of the coparcener. Separate business carried on by Karta on joint family premises which is not detrimental to property and business would not become joint family business.[71]


Property held by a sole surviving coparcener may constitute his separate property and on his death it will devolve by succession on his heirs, and any custom giving preference to collateral would be void.[72] Status of property in the hands of unmarried person at the time of family settlement would be his individual property and not HUF. Wife and children of such person cannot claim right in the same by birth or marriage.[73]


On derecognition of a ruler, his non-state separate property will continue to be his separate property.[74]

This article is written by Priya Bishnoi and edited by Rupreet Kaur Dhariwal.

[1]Radha V. Ram, 1985 Pat. 285.

[2]Md. Hussain V. Beboo, 1937 All. 655.

[3]P. Periasami V. Periasami, 1980 Mad. 33 (entire case law reviewed); See also Balak Ram V. Shiv Ram, 1988 J.&K. 33.

[4]1997 S.C. 1251.

[5]Dipo V. Wassan Singh, 1983 S.C. 846; Vijaya V. Kumta, AIR 1995 Kant 35; Om V. Sarjit, 1995 HP 92.

[6]Gyan Chand V. Ram Chander,2014 (209) DLT 336.

[7](1902) 25 Mad. 678.

[8] 1937 All. 655.

[9] (1958) S.C.J. 1268.

[10]Karuppi V. Sankaranarayan, (1904) 27 Mad. 300; see also Prithi V. Yatinder, 1985 P.&H. 238; Om Prakash V. Savjit Singh, 1995 HP 92.

[11]Dharam Singh V. Sadhu Singh, 1997 P.&H. 198.

[12]Jagir Singh V. Amar Singh, Air 2004 P.&H. 51.

[13]1985 S.C. 716.

[14]Kondiram V. Krishna, 1995 SC 279; See also Purabashi V. Raj Kumar, 1995, Ori. 284.


[16] 1986 SC 79.

[17] 1953 S.C. 495: K.R. Ramaswami V. Premabai, 1988 Kant. 116.

[18]Parthasarthi V. Commr. Of Income Tax, 1967 Mad. 227.

[19]Mathayee V. Kumarshen,1967 S.C. 569.

[20]1964 S.C. 510.

[21]See also Karuppa V. Palanammai, 1963 Mad. 245; Kamla Devi V. Bachulal,1957 S.C. 348; Venkatasubramania V. Eswara, 1966 Mad. 266.

[22]2004 S.C. 1284.

[23]Tripura Sundri V. Kalyanaramana 1973 Mad. 90.

[24]Guramma V. Mallappa, 1964, 1964 S.C. 510.

[25]Kishan V. Ranachari, 1965 Mad. 340; Chetti V. Chetti, 1991 Ori. 322.

[26]Sundar Saanam V. Narasimhulu, (1902) 25 Mad. 149; Bhawan Dayal V. Reoti, 1963 S.C. 287.

[27]P.M. Mani V. P.S. Mohan Kumar, 2002 Mad. 402.

[28]Laxmi V. Ishroo, 1977 S.C. 1694.

[29]Gurbachan Singh V. Puran Singh, 1961 S.C. 1963, a case under Punjab Customary Law.

[30]1961, S.C. 1268

[31]1976, SC 1715

[32]Pushpa V. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1977 S.C. 2230; Vasant V. Sakharam, 1983 Bom. 495.

[33]Vithoba V. Hiriba, (1986) 6 B.H.C.R. 54; Pertakaruppan V. Arunachalam, 1927 Mad. 676; Mallesappa V. Mallappa 1961 S.C. 1268.

[34]Gyarsibai V. Jamnalal, 1973 M.P. 75.

[35]Patram V. Bahadur, 1983 All, 384; Nilkanth V. Ramchandra, 1991 Bom. 10.

[36]Sivaji V. Rukminiyam, 1973 Mys. 113.

[37]Srinivas V. Narayandevji, 1995 S.C. 379; Ram V. Ranibahu,1985 M.P. 73.

[38]1958 All. 42.

[39]1953 M.B. 28; See also Jugal V. Narayan, 1982 Cal. 342.

[40]See also Avadesh V. Sheo Shankar, 1985 All. 104.

[41]1958 Panj. 116; see also Lalbarmani V. Bhutnath, 1974 Cal. 109.

[42]Vijaben V. Vashranu, 1989 Guj. 75.

[43]Prakash V. Narendra 1976 S.C., 2456.

[44]1959 S.C. 1926.

[45]Chandrashekhar V. Pitambari, 1060 S.C., 335; K.V. Narayana Swami V. K.B.R. Iyer 1965 S.C. 289.

[46]Sidramappa V. Babaiappa, 1962 Mys. 38.

[47]Venkatasubramania V. Eswara Iyer, 1966 Mad. 266.

[48]Jethariam V. Hazarmal, 1962 Raj. 283; Chodrashewer V. Ramchandra, 1973 Pat. 250.

[49]Kumaraswami V. Subba, 1977 Mad. 353.

[50]Santanu V. Bairagi, 1995 Ori. 300.

[51]Vasistha XVII, 51; Vyasa. Digest. II.

[52]Manu, IH. Gautama, XXVIII.

[53]C. Venkatasubramania V. Eswara, 1966 Mad. 266.

[54]1960 S.C., 997.

[55] 1968 S.C. 678.

[56]1968 S.C. 678 at p. 681.

[57]1969 S.C. 297.

[58]Bhagat Singh V.  Commr. Of Income Tax, 1950 Punj. 594.

[59]Prem Nath V. Commr. Of Income Tax, 1967 Punj. 1 (F.B.); See also Bhagwata V. Digamber, 1986 S.C. 79.

[60]Ramayya V. Kolanda, 1939 Mad. 911; Lalchandhra V. Channavadu, 1963 A.P. 31.

[61]1954 Mad. 282.

[62]1869 Mad. 329; Kumaraswami V. Subba, 1977 Mad. 353.

[63]Kumaraswami V. Subba, 1977 Mad. 353.

[64]Balamba V. Krihnayya, 1914 Mad. 595; Venkata Subbarao V. Laxminarayanamma, 1954 Mad. 222.

[65]1960 S.C. 403.

[66]1969 A.P. 188.

[67]Katama V. Raja of Shivaganga, (1863) 9 M.L.A. 539; Jitendra V. Sharat, 1981 N.O.C., 208 (A.P.).

[68]Mahant V. Sitaram, (1891) 21 All. 53 (P.C.).

[69]Krishanji V. Moro, (1891) 15 Bom. 32 (P.C.); Jayarama V. Thulasi, 1976 Mad. 17.

[70]Prakash V. Narendra, 1976 S.C. 2456.

[71]P.S. Sairam V. P.S. Rama Rao Pisey, AIR  2004 SC 1619.

[72]Dipo V. Wassam Singh, 1983 SC 846.

[73]Master Neel Dayal V. Someshwar Dayal, 2017 Del. 120.

[74]Shantadevi V. Shrimant Sangram Singh, AIR 1996 Guj. 32; Maharaja Dagat Singh V. Bhawani Singh, 1996 Del. 14.

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